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Abstract. This paper presents the extraction of a legal access control policy and 
a conflict resolution policy from the EU Data Protection Directive [1]. These 
policies are installed in a multi-policy authorization infrastructure described in 
[2, 3]. A Legal Policy Decision Point (PDP) is constructed with a legal access 
control policy to provide automated decisions based on the relevant legal 
provisions. The legal conflict resolution policy is configured into a Master PDP 
to make sure that the legal access control policy gets priority over access 
control policies provided by other authorities i.e. the data subject, the data 
issuer and the data controller. We describe how clauses of the Directive are 
converted into access control rules based on attributes of the subject, action, 
resource and environment. There are currently some limitations in the 
conversion process, since the majority of provisions requires additional 
interpretation by humans. These provisions cannot be converted into 
deterministic rules for the PDP. Other provisions do allow for the extraction of 
PDP rules but need to be tailored to the application environment before they are 
configured into the Legal PDP. 
Keywords: Legal PDP, Legal Access Control Policy, Conflict Resolution 
Policy, EU Data Protection Directive.  
1 Introduction 
Although there are a number of legal instruments aiming to protect the personal data 
of individuals [1, 4-7], the proper enforcement of these laws is often lacking. If the 
access control rules contained in these laws could be integrated in authorization 
infrastructures, this would arguably make the enforcement of data protection 
requirements more efficient and effective. 
The use of policy based systems to protect personal data based on access control 
policies not new [8-11]. When developing a privacy preserving systems, it is 
important to keep in mind both the rights of the data subject as well as the legitimate 
interests of others. This balance of rights is critical and other researches, when 
designing policy based authorization systems to protect the privacy of personal data, 
have often overlooked this matter and focused primarily on the policy of the data 
subject [8, 9]. In comparison, we have attempted to support this balance by building 
multiple policy decision points (PDPs) into the authorization system so that all the 
stakeholders can express their own independent policies[2]. The system is designed to 
include access control polices and conflict resolution polices [3] from different 
authors, possibly written in different policy languages (such as XACMLv2 [12], 
XACMLv3 [13], PERMIS [14], P3P [15] and so on) and these policies will be 
enforced in separate PDPs. Their decisions will then be combined by a Master PDP 
using the most appropriate conflict resolution policy. 
For each item of personal data we consider policies may be written by up to four 
different types of authors: the law (the access control rules extracted from legislation 
will form a Legal PDP), the data issuer (e.g. for a degree certificate the university is 
the issuer, whilst for a personal diary the data subject is the issuer), the data subject 
(i.e. the individual to whom the data relates), and the data controller (i.e. the 
organization that is legally responsible for the personal data processing). When the 
controller’s (or processor’s) system receives a request to access a data item, it first 
retrieves all the policies related to the data item. The conflict resolution policies are 
prioritized in the order of law, issuer, data subject and controller. The policy which 
has the highest priority and is applicable to the current request is used by the Master 
PDP to resolve any conflicting decisions from the access control policies of the 
various authors.  
The issuer’s and subject’s policies will always travel with the data as it moves 
across organizational boundaries. The controller’s policy may or may not be 
transferred, since there might be a contract between the receiver (controller or 
processor) and sending controller which ensures that the receiver’s policy shall be 
configured correctly. Alternatively, a subset of the sending controller’s policy might 
be sent and merged with that of the receiver. The legal policy will not travel with the 
data if the data stays within the same jurisdiction (assuming the authorization system 
in the same jurisdiction has the same Legal PDP), but if the data is transferred to a 
foreign jurisdiction then it will be transferred. How foreign and local legal policies 
should interact and which should take precedence is still a matter for further study, 
since at the moment the rules for this are too complex to automate. We do not address 
this issue in the current paper, except that our Legal PDP can restrict the transfer of 
personal data to jurisdictions which do not have adequate legal protection unless the 
transfer is permitted by another lawful basis.  
The main contribution of this paper is to present the rights of different groups of 
users to access any personal data as specified in the EU Data Protection Directive 
(EDPD), and to convert as many of these rights as possible into the rules of both an 
access control policy (held in a Legal PDP) and a conflict resolution policy (held in a 
Master PDP) so that automated and independent legally compliant decisions can be 
obtained. To our knowledge no other authorization system has such an integrated 
system. Having a separate Legal PDP and Master PDP is necessary to ensure that 
certain legal policies take priority over all other policies so that the rights provided by 
the law are not overridden.  
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related works; 
Section 3 describes the various steps of the methodology. Section 4 describes the 
validation test results and finally section 5 presents the limitations and conclusions. 
 
  
2 Related work 
The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [16] is a privacy language 
that helps policy writers to define terms, conditions and rules to protect customers’ 
personal information. However, it does not provide the ability to express statements 
that need to be enforced by multiple policies or for the logical combination of 
policies. The NEURONA [17, 18] project developed a data protection application 
based on the Spanish data protection requirements that offer reports regarding the 
correct application of security measures to files containing personal data. If a file 
contains personal data but does not comply with the adequate level of security this is 
classified as an erroneous file by their ontology. They provide a semi-automated way 
to determine whether some aspects of the current state of a company's personal data 
files might not comply with the established set of regulations. Travis et al. [19-22] 
worked to automate the derivation of security requirements from regulations. They 
applied their method to the HIPAA regulations, but there is insufficient assessment of 
its applicability to other regulations [19]. Furthermore there are limitations in their 
method such as relying upon a specific format of regulatory texts, and relying on the 
analyst’s skills [20]. In comparison, our work is based on an analysis and extraction 
of rules from the EDPD and converting these into executable policies so that 
automated decisions can be returned from a Master PDP. 
3 Methodology 
The methodology that we used to extract access control and conflict resolution rules 
from the EDPD [1] consists of seven procedural steps described below. 
3.1 Step 1. Identifying provisions of the EDPD related to access control 
The EDPD consists of seven chapters and 34 articles. We considered only those 
provisions which are directly related to access control. A provision is directly related 
to access control if it pertains directly to the access, collection, blocking or transfer of 
personal data.The general rules for the lawful processing of personal data are 
provided in chapter 2. The legitimate bases on which personal data can be processed 
are mentioned in Article 7. The legitimate bases on which sensitive personal data can 
be processed are mentioned in article 8. The information to be provided to the data 
subject while collecting or processing personal data is described in articles 10 and 11. 
Article 12 sets for the rights of the data subject with regards to the processing of 
his/her personal data, namely the rights of access, notice, rectification or blocking. 
The potential exemptions and restrictions to these rights are provided in article 13. 
The conditions under which personal data can be transferred to third countries are 
mentioned in articles 25 and 26; whilst article 28 describes the rights of supervisory 
authorities who is responsible for monitoring the application of their national data 
protection legislation. 
3.2 Step 2. Extracting the Legal Access Control Policy 
The provisions related to access control were examined one by one to assess whether 
they could (at least in part) be converted into rules that could be enforced 
automatically. Only the rules that are capable of giving an independent access control 
decision were kept i.e. the rules that are capable of saying who is allowed to perform 
which action on personal data under what conditions, or under what conditions 
personal data can be accessed. A provision was discarded if i) no  access control rule 
can be extracted or ii) the extracted rule requires human judgment which cannot be 
easily translated into a deterministic rule, so that a fully automated enforcement is not 
possible. For example, article 6.1 (a) says “personal data must be processed fairly and 
lawfully” – this rule on its own is too vague to form an access control rule. Later in 
article 7 the criteria for making data processing legitimate are described, some of 
which can be converted into access control rules. For instance, article 7(a) states that 
“personal data may be processed only if the data subject has unambiguously given his 
consent”. In our proposed system the data subject provides his/her consent in the form 
of the subject’s privacy policy which says who may access his/her data for what 
purposes.  
Article 6.2 states that “It shall be for the controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is 
complied with.” This rule places responsibility on the controller to ensure that the 
EDPD is followed, but it does not form an access control rule itself. Article 8.2 (b) 
states that “processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations 
and specific rights of the controller in the field of employment law insofar as it is 
authorized by national law providing for adequate safeguards” which is too complex 
to convert into an access control rule as it would for instance require encoding of all 
the employment laws. Article 12(b) states that “as appropriate the rectification, 
erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with the 
provisions of this Directive” is not possible to convert into an automated rule as it 
requires human judgement to evaluate whether the processing complies with the 
Directive. Article 12 (c) requires that third parties to whom data were disclosed be 
notified of any rectification, erasure or blocking carried out in compliance with article 
12 (b). This rule is not feasible to present as an access control rule, but rather requires 
an update mechanism to satisfy the condition. After completing step 2 a total of 21 
natural language rules were obtained. 
The obligation to “Log the request” has been added only to the rules in which the 
actions may not have an immediate effect. For example, a data update request from 
the data subject may not take immediate effect if the controller needs to verify the 
accuracy or any other condition of the data.  
Table 1. The Natural Language and Formalized Rules 
1.  Natural language rule: If the requested purpose of processing does not match with the original purpose 
of data collection or is not for a historical purpose/statistical purpose / scientific purpose OR the validity 
time of data is before the requested time then deny the request. [From articles 6.1 (b) and 6.1 (e).] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject: Anyone Resource: Personal Data  Action: 
Read Condition: NOT (RequestedPurpose = PurposeOfCollection OR RequestedPurpose = historical 
purpose OR RequestedPurpose = statistical purpose OR RequestedPurpose =scientific purpose) OR 
validity time earlier than the requested time. Formalised elements for ACR: Effect: Deny  
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit Obligation: use DCA=denyOverrides 
  
2.  Natural language rule: A data subject can send data update requests for his/her personal data.[From 
article 6.1 (d) and article 12 (b).It is not possible to make an access control rule to verify which data are 
inaccurate or incompatible with regard to the purposes they were collected.  However, this rule ensures 
that the data subject can send a data update request if he/she finds that the data is not accurate and the 
controller can either delete or update the data after judging the validity of the subject’s request. The 
complete enforcement of this legal rule therefore requires human judgment.] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject: Data Subject Resource: Personal Data 
Action: DataUpdateRequest 
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect:  Permit Obligation: Log the request. 
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides 
3.  Natural language rule: A data subject can submit a policy / update a policy for his/her personal data. 
[From articles 7 (a) and 8. 2 (a), by submitting and updating a policy the data subject can give or update 
or revoke his/her consent] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject: Data Subject Resource: Personal Data 
Action: SubmitPolicy/ UpdatePolicy 
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect:  Permit 
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit  Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides 
4.  Natural language rule: If the purpose of data processing is performance of a contract and both the data 
subject and the requester are parties to the contract then grant access to the resource mentioned in the 
contract. [From article 7 (b) and 15.2 (a)] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject: Anyone Resource: Personal Data Action: 
Read/Write Condition: RequestedPurpose = performance of contract AND PartyOfContract= Data 
Subject AND PartyOfContract= Requester, AND requested resource = resource specified in contract 
Formalised elements for ACR:Effect:  Permit   
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides 
5.  Natural language rule: Entities with a specific role (e.g. social security authority) can access a specific 
resource type (e.g., personal data related to pensions) and if the purpose is the performance of a task of 
public interest (e.g., social security administration) or an exercise of official authority. [From article 7 
(e). The roles  and resource types in the rule will need to be configured in light of the application and the 
national legislation.] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject: Role X ResourceType:  Y  Action: Read  
Condition:RequestedPurpose = performance of a task of public interest OR RequestedPurpose = 
exercise of official authority 
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect: Permit   
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides 
6.  Natural language rule: Anyone with a Data Access Mandate can access the personal data. [From 
articles 7 (c), 8.2 (e) and 8.4]. See also section 3.5.  
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject : Anyone  Resource :  Personal Data  Action:  
Access Condition: DataAccessMandate=true   
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect:  Permit  
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides 
7.  Natural language rule: A data subject can read his/her personal data if there is no legal objection 
within national legislation [From art. 12 and 13.1]  
a.  Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject : Data Subject Resource: Personal Data 
Action:   Read Condition: LegalObjection = true 
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect: Deny   
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=denyOverrides.  
b. Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject: Data Subject Resource: Personal Data 
Action:   Read  
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect: Grant   
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides.  
 [The rules will be executed in order, so that rule b will only be true if the condition of rules a is false or 
missing] 
8.  Natural language rule: The treating Medical Professional can Read/Write medical data for the purpose 
of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, prevention of care or treatment or the management of health 
care service. [From article 8.3] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject: Medical Professional Resource : Medical 
Data Action:  Read / Write Condition:  Medical Professional = a treating Medical Professional of the 
patient AND RequestedPurpose = medical diagnosis/ the provision of care and treatment / preventive 
medicine.  
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect: Permit 
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides.  
9.  Natural language rule: Medical professionals can BTG (break the glass) to medical data for purpose of 
medical diagnosis/ the provision of care and treatment / preventive medicine. [From articles 7 (d) and 
8.2 (c). Break the glass is the ability to override access controls in case of emergency in order to gain 
access to data which is normally denied to the requester. This rule is an example of accessing personal 
data to save the vital interest of the data subject.] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject: Medical Professional Resource: Medical 
Data  Action:  Read / Write Condition:  RequestedPurpose =  medical diagnosis/ the provision of care 
and treatment / preventive medicine.  
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect:  BTG   
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides.  
10.  Natural language rule: The data subject can send "Object to Processing" with an obligation to log the 
request. [From article 12 (b), 14 (b) and 15.1] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR:  Subject: Data Subject  Resource: Personal Data 
Action: Object to Processing  
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect: permit, Obligation: Log the request 
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides.  
11.  Natural language rule: Medical Professional can BTG to transfer medical data to a non EU/EEA 
country not having an adequate level of protection. [From article 26.1 (e)] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR:  Subject: Medical Professional  Resource: Medical 
Data  Action: Transfer to Country=X Condition: value of X = non EU/EEA country not having 
adequate level of protection   
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect: BTG 
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides.  
12.  Natural language rule: Anyone can transfer personal data from public register. [From article 26.1 (f)] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject:Anyone  Resource: personal data in public 
register  Action: Transfer to Country=X Condition: value of  X = one of the non EU/EEA country not 
having adequate level of protection  
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect:  Permit 
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides.  
13.  Natural language rule: Personal data can be transferred to a non EU/EEA country not having an 
adequate level of protection if the subject unambiguously consents to the transfer OR if the purpose is 
performance of contract and the parties of contract are data subject and controller OR the parties of 
contract are controller and third party and contract’s beneficiary is the data subject OR there is a transfer 
mandate; otherwise deny the transfer.” [from article 26.1 (a), (b), (c), (d), 26.2 and 25.4] 
a.  Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject: Anyone Resource:   Personal data       
Action:   transfer to country=X Condition:   value of  X =  (one of the non EU countries OR countries 
not having adequate level of protection) AND(value of SubjectConsentsToTransferTo= ID of requester 
OR (RequestedPurpose = performance of a contract AND ((PartyOfContract=Data Subject AND 
PartyOfContract= controller) OR (PartyOfContract=controller AND SubjectOfContract=dataSubject 
AND BeneficiaryOfContract=Data Subject))) OR DataTransferMandate= true) 
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect:  Permit  
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides.  
b.  Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject:   Anyone  Resource:   Personal data    
Action:   transfer to country = X Condition:  value of to “country X” ≠   one of the countries in the list 
of allowed countries  
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect: Deny   
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=denyOverrides.  
[The rules are executed in order, so the rule b will only be executed when the conditions of a is not 
satisfied] 
14.  Natural language rule: The Supervisory Authority can access and collect personal data for the 
performance of supervisory duties. [From article 28.3] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject: Supervisory Authority Resource: Personal 
data Action: Access/ Collect Condition: RequestedPurpose= performance of supervisory duties   
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect: Permit 
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides. 
  
15.  Natural language rule: The Supervisory Authority can order the blocking/erasing /destruction of data, 
or impose a temporary ban on the processing or impose a definitive ban on processing. [From article 
28.3] 
Formalized elements for both ACR and CRR: Subject   Supervisory Authority  Resource:   Personal 
data Action: Order to block/ Order to erase / Order to destruct / Impose temporary ban/ impose 
definitive ban Condition: RequestedPurpose= performance of supervisory duties  
Formalised elements for ACR: Effect:  Permit Obligation: LogTheOrder 
Formalised elements for CRR: Effect: Permit, Obligation: use DCA=grantOverrides.  
3.3 Step 3. Refining the Access Control Rules 
The natural language rules from step 2 were refined during this step by eliminating 
redundancy and duplication and by joining the rules together (if possible) to reduce 
their number. For example, the rule to deny an access if the purposes don’t match 
with the original purposes of collection and the rule of denying an access if the 
request is made after the validity time is over are combined to form one rule. The two 
rules that allow/deny access to personal data by the data subject are combined 
together and the five rules that allow/deny the transfer of personal data to another 
country are combined to form a single rule. This left fifteen rules which are shown in 
Table 1. The order of rules is also determined at this step. For example, while 
combining the rules to allow/deny access to the data subject, the more specific rules 
that restrict the access are placed before the rule that grants access to the data subject. 
This ordering makes sure that the data subject can get access only when the 
conditions for which restrictions apply are false.    
3.4 Step 4. Formalizing the Access Control Rules 
In this step each of the natural language rules was formalized in the form of an Access 
Control Rule (ACR) and a Conflict Resolution Rule (CRR) as follows: 
 
ACR – Subject: (who) Resource: (which data item) Action: (what action) Condition: 
(under what conditions) Effect: (Permit, Deny or BTG1) Optional Obligation: (subject 
to these actions being carried out); 
CRR – Subject: (who) Resource: (which data item) Action: (what action) Condition: 
(under what conditions) Effect: (Permit) Obligation: (Decision Combining Algorithm 
(DCA) to be returned). 
 
Each legal ACR rule has a matching CRR to make sure the legal rule gets precedence 
over any other author’s rules. The difference between the CRR and its corresponding 
ACR is that the effect of the CRR is always Permit and the obligational ways returns 
the DCA that is applicable. If an ACR has an effect of Deny, the corresponding DCA 
                                                          
1
 Break the Glass means that the requester is not normally allowed to access the resource, but if 
they deem it to be an emergency situation, they can override the access controls and access the 
resource, in the full knowledge that their actions will be monitored and they will be answerable 
for them to a higher authority. 
is denyOverrides and if an ACR has an effect of Permit the corresponding DCA is 
grantOverrides. If the ACR has an effect of BTG, the CRR’s DCA is grantOverrides, 
since a grant from another PDP should not require the requester to first break the glass 
before gaining access. The formalization of ACRs and CRRs is provided in Table1. 
3.5 Step 5. Attribute determination 
For automated execution of these rules in an attribute based access control (ABAC) 
system [23] we need to determine the attributes of each of the elements in the rules. 
Four different types of attribute are used in constructing the policy rules. 1. Subject 
attributes 2. Action attributes 3. Resource attributes 4. Environment attributes. Subject 
attributes identify the users who are to be granted or denied access. Action attributes 
describe the action that is being controlled. Resource attributes describe the protected 
resource. In this case they are the metadata which describes the personal data being 
protected, and comprise attributes such as: resource type, data owner/issuer, data 
subject, date of creation etc.  Environmental attributes describe the context in which 
the rule applies, such as time of day, location etc. These four types of attribute are 
also used to describe a user’s request to access a resource, and are passed to the PDP 
in the request context by the application. PDPs compare the attributes of the user’s 
request with those of the rules to determine whether access should be granted or not. 
We assume that the application is capable of storing the resource and its metadata 
securely, and retrieving the resource attributes and passing them to the Master PDP in 
the request context when a request for accessing that resource is received. 
o The data subject is determined based on his/her set of identifying attributes 
(such as name and address, e-mail address, NI number, NHS Number etc.) given at 
the time the personal data is submitted or during the registration of the subject with 
the controller for a service. These identifying attributes become part of the resource’s 
metadata. The Legal PDP checks if these identifying attributes match those of the 
requester (passed with the request context as subject attributes) to determine whether 
the requester is the data subject or not for the requested resource. In the current 
implementation the following sets of uniquely identifying attributes are used:{name 
and address}, {e-mail address}, or {NHS Number}, but these sets are configurable 
and can be changed and extended as needed by the application. The data subject 
should be able to choose any of these set of attributes to identify her/himself. 
o ResourceType is a resource attribute that holds the type of the data, such as 
medical record, and is placed as a metadata of the resource by the issuer of the data. 
Only the issuer of the data can modify the ResourceType of that data. An ontology is 
needed to classify the different types of personal data, and an ontology mapping 
server (e.g. as described in [3]) may be used to hold the data classification ontology 
and be able to determine whether a resource type is a type of personal data or not. The 
ontology server may also determine the relationship among these data types. For 
example, all the medical data types are subclasses of personal data. The rules for 
personal data will therefore be applicable to medical data but not the other way 
around. 
  
o PurposeOfCollection (mentioned in rule 1 of Table 1) is another resource 
metadata attribute that states the set of purposes for which the data was collected from 
the data subject. It is set by the application when the data is first collected from the 
data subject. The Legal PDP matches this set with the RequestedPurpose(s) stated by 
the requester in the request context. 
o ValidityTime (mentioned in rule 1 of Table 1) is another resource metadata 
attribute collected from the issuer or data subject. A default value can also be set by 
the controller if the issuer or data subject does not provide a value for it. The 
controller will need to mention the default validity time of the data when collecting it.  
The Legal PDP matches the time of the access request (passed as an environment 
attribute of the request context) with the ValidityTime of the requested data.  
o Treating medical professional (mentioned in rule 8 of Table 1) is identified 
by an identifying attribute stored in the medical record of the patient (as a part of the 
metadata). The value of this attribute must match that of the equivalent attribute of the 
requester, in order for the requester to be identified as the treating medical 
professional. The name of this attribute is configurable in the legal policy. 
o Medical Professional/ Supervisory Authority are Role attributes (mentioned 
in rules 5, 8, 9, 14 and 15 of Table 1) provided by trusted Attribute Authorities. Who 
are the trusted authorities for which roles depends upon the application, and these are 
configurable values in the legal policy.  
o LegalObjection (mentioned in the rule 7 of Table 1) is a Boolean attribute of a 
resource (metadata) which are used to flag personal data which is not accessible to the 
data subject because of national legislation which contains an exception to the data 
subject’s right of access (e.g., a doctor may have the ability to invoke a therapeutic 
exception to prevent the patient from accessing certain information). These attributes 
can only be issued by the designated (trusted) authorities.   
o Data Access Mandate/ Data Transfer Mandate (mentioned in rules 6 and 13 
of Table 1) are credentials which can only be obtained by a requester following the 
appropriate legal procedure. Conceptually these are treated as subject attributes in the 
policy, so that if a requester possesses the appropriate mandate attribute he/she 
inherits the permissions assigned to the mandate (the Data Access Mandate is 
assigned for allowing access to personal data and the Data Transfer Mandate is 
assigned for allowing the transfer of personal data). These legal mandates are issued 
by various trusted Attribute Authorities and both the trusted authorities and mandate 
types are configurable to suit the application. The requester (or the Attribute 
Authority) presents the Mandate to the application which will either verify it using a 
Credential Validation Service and pass the valid attribute to the PDP as a subject 
attribute, or pass it to the PDP as a subject credential for the latter to verify. 
o PartyOfContract and SubjectOfContract (mentioned in rules 4 and 13 of 
Table 1) are attributes of a contract. A contract is hypothesised to be a digitally signed 
XML document which has an element called PartyOfContract containing the IDs of 
the people who are parties to the contract, and an element called SubjectOfContract 
containing the ID of the data subject. When a requester wants to access a subject’s 
personal data for a purpose related to performance of the contract s/he will present the 
contract to the system. The ID of the data subject will be matched with the attributes 
in the contract. If both the requester and the subject are parties of the contract then 
access will be granted. If both the requester and the controller are parties of the 
contract and the data subject is the subject of the contract, then access will be granted. 
For validating contracts, a new trusted component called a Contract Validation 
Service (ConVS) is added to the system. To be able to access a data item based on a 
contract the requested data item should be mentioned in the contract. Therefore, in the 
contract along with the ID of the data subject (as a SubjectOfContract) the 
ResourceType is mentioned. If the requested resource’s ResourceType and ID of the 
Data Subject mentioned in the metadata of the resource do not match with the 
ResourceType and the ID of the SubjectOfContract mentioned in the contract the 
access will not be granted based on contract. 
o SubjectConsentsToTransferTo (mentioned in rule 13 of Table 1)is an 
environment attribute set by the application to the ID of the requester when a data 
subject consents to transfer his/her personal data to a requester. A requester can send a 
request for consent (via the application) to the data subject for transferring his/her 
personal data. If the data subject agrees to the transfer s/he can give his/her consent 
via the application (e.g. by clicking a button or ticking a box). This consent will be 
stored by the application and when the requester requests the data this consent (in the 
form of SubjectConsentsToTransferTo environment attribute) is appended to the 
request context by the application.  
3.6 Steps 6 and 7. Implementation and Validation 
The legal ACP (Access Control Policy) and legal CRP (Conflict Resolution Policy) 
containing the ACRs and CRRs have been converted into machine executable policies 
using both the XACML and PERMIS policy languages. For the construction of the 
CRP the format presented in [3] is followed. All the CRPs are inserted in order into a 
Master PDP with the precedence of law, issuer, data subject and controller. When the 
first executed condition is satisfied by a request context a Grant decision is returned 
along with an obligation to use the enclosed DCA which is used to combine the 
various decisions returned by the Legal, issuer’s, data subject’s and controller’s PDPs. 
The current implementation of the system can be downloaded from [24].  
The authorization server is initialized with a configured Legal PDP, controller’s 
PDP and Master PDP (containing a set of CRPs). Data subjects’ access control 
policies are dynamically inserted into the system as sticky policies when the subjects’ 
personal data is first received. Likewise a data issuer’s access control policy may also 
be received as a sticky policy along with the data, unless the data controller or data 
subject is also the data issuer. In the former case the issuer’s policy will be created 
when the data is created locally, in the latter case there won’t be an issuer’s policy. 
On the receipt of an authorization decision request, the authorization server retrieves 
the issuer’s and the subject’s sticky policies based on the requested resource id. A 
  
limitation of the current implementation is that it cannot dynamically process sticky 
conflict resolution policies. 
Validation is performed by loading the XML implementation of legal policies 
into two PDPs – the Master PDP which determines and enforces the applicable DCA 
for each access request, and the Legal PDP which returns the legal decision for the 
request. These PDPs are then combined with the subject’s, issuer’s and controller’s 
PDPs as appropriate. A set of test cases were generated in which various parties make 
different requests to access different personal data items. Comparison is done to see if 
the machine generated decisions and the human computed (correct) decisions are the 
same. 
4 Validation Test Results 
In order to validate the system two different sets of scenarios were developed: 
medical and employment. Here we only describe a subset of the medical scenario. 
Patient Mr. M registers with the Kent Health Centre and completes a registration 
form. He also gives his policy for access to his data, namely: Researchers are allowed 
to view my medical data for the purpose of medical research if the data is 
anonymized.  His conflict resolution policy is: if a request is for my personal data 
DCA=denyOverrides. In addition the controller’s policies say: 1. Administrative 
Officers can read and write administrative data (such as the contact information of 
patients, and which doctor is treating which patient etc.) but can’t access the medical 
data.  2. Financial Officers can read the billing and payment information but can’t 
read the medical data or administrative data. 3. Medical professionals can’t access the 
billing and payment information or the patient’s financial information. The 
controller’s CRR says, for the request of any data the DCA is grantOverrides. Each 
resource has a unique RID and each resource consists of data and meta data. When 
creating data about a subject, the issuer mentions his ID (it can be a Role instead) for 
identifying himself and also mentions his access control policy saying 1. Only the 
issuer of the data can change the metadata such as the ResourceType. 2. Medical 
Professional can issue LegalObjection if there is a therapeutic exception which means 
that if the  Medical Professional thinks that seeing the medical record may cause any 
mental or physical harm to the patient then s/he can issue a LegalObjection to stop the 
data subject from seeing the record. An inbuilt issuer CRR says that if the requester is 
the issuer and the resource=metadata then DCA=grantOverrides. An issuer is 
identified by the ID s/he provides when s/he first issues the data.  
Mr. M goes for treatment to Dr. D at the Kent Health Center. When Dr. D tries 
to access Mr. M’s medical data the Legal CRP returns grantOverrides and the Legal 
PDP returns Grant (based on rule 8 of Table 1) and so the final decision is Grant. Mr. 
M then has an X-ray. Dr. D enters the preliminary results into the Mr. M’s record, and 
again the Legal PDP grants access as before. Dr. D decides to refer the patient to a 
lung specialist Dr. S at a London Hospital. Mr. M goes to Dr. S at the London 
hospital, who tries to access Mr. M’s record at the Kent Health Center. The Legal 
CRP returns grantOverrides and the Legal PDP returns decision BTG (based on rule 
9) and the other PDPs return notApplicable as they don’t have any policy regarding 
the request. BTG is the final decision which is meant to be used for exceptional 
situations only. Dr. S suggests that Mr. M changes his policy at the Kent Health 
Center to allow Dr. S to access his medical data in future without having to break the 
glass. Mr. M requests the Kent Health Center to update his access control policy. The 
Legal CRP returns grantOverrides as the data subject is requesting to update his 
policy and the Legal PDP returns Grant (based on rule 3), so Mr. M changes his 
policy to allow Dr. S at the London hospital to access his medical record. The next 
time Dr. S tries to access the medical record the Legal CRP returns grantOverrides 
and the Legal PDP returns BTG as before, while Mr. M’s PDP returns Grant; so the 
final decision is Grant and Dr. S can read the medical record straight way.  
Mr. M is suspected of having an illness of which Dr. S suspects that if Mr. M 
knows this it would be harmful for him to know that at the moment, so he issues 
LegalObjection=True for the metadata of this medical data to protect the data subject 
from a serious harm. This is granted due to the issuer ACR and CRR. Now Mr. M 
requests to view all his medical data. The application goes through each record asking 
if Mr. M can read the record. The Metadata of this specific medical record of Mr. M 
will have. The Legal CRP returns denyOverrides and the Legal PDP returns decision 
Deny for this record (based on rule7.a) and Grant for the other records (based on rule 
7.b), so Mr. M does not learn of this specific illness. 
An administrative officer tries to read the Medical record of Mr. M. The Legal 
CRP and Issuer CRP do not have any CRR matching the request context so the 
DataSubject’s CRP returns denyOverrides. The Legal, issuer and Mr. M’s PDPs 
return notApplicable, whilst the controller’s PDP returns Deny so the final decision is 
Deny. 
A researcher wants to access the medical data of Mr. M for medical research at 
the Kent Health Centre. The DCA is denyOverrides by the DataSubject’s CRP. The 
Legal, issuer and controller PDPs return notApplicable, Mr. M’s PDP returns Grant 
with an obligation to anonymise the data. If the obligation can be fulfilled by the 
application then a Grant decision (according to the algorithm of denyOverrides [3]) is 
returned along with the anonymised data. If the obligation can’t be fulfilled a Deny 
decision is returned. 
5 Conclusion and future work 
We have presented a system that incorporates a Legal PDP and legal conflict 
resolution rules into an authorization server to enforce several of the rights and 
obligations outlined in the EDPD. The main advantage of having a separate Legal 
PDP is that it can automatically enforce certain legal provisions and allows 
administrators to see what these rules are. Having separate conflict resolution rules 
enforced by a Master PDP ensures that no other PDP can override the decisions of the 
Legal PDP. However, both the current design and implementation have their 
limitations. The Legal PDP does not completely capture all the legal constrains due to 
the complexity and nature of some of its rules. Some conditions are extremely 
complex to automate and some decisions are highly dependent on human judgment 
and/or intervention, so these cannot be automated. For instance, if a data subject 
  
exercises his right of deletion or blocking of data on the basis that the data was 
obtained unlawfully, human intervention is necessary in order to determine whether 
this is in fact the case. Furthermore, how foreign and local legal policies should 
interact and which should take precedence is still a matter for further study, since at 
the moment the rules for this are too complex to automate. The proposed approach is 
therefore an initial proof of concept only. Several requirements may be far more 
complex in practice than are presented here, due to the divergences of national or 
sector specific laws from the European Directive. In a future contribution we aim to 
develop rules which can better accommodate this greater complexity.  
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